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Microstructure Theory and
the Foreign Exchange Market
GROWING BODY OF theoretical literature,
known as the study of securities market micro-
structure, deals with the behavior of participants
in securities markets and with the effects of in-
formation and institutional rules on the economic
performance of those markets. These institu-
tional factors may arise from technology, tradi-
tion or regulation. Microstructure and its impact
are important, because of the vast amounts of
wealth which pass through securities markets —
including the foreign exchange market —
every day.
Microstructure is of interest to students of the
foreign exchange market: microstructural analy-
ses of other markets have yielded insight into
traders’ behavior and the effect of various insti-
tutional arrangements. Conversely, the foreign
exchange market is also of special interest to
students of microstructure, because it combines
two very different arrangements for matching
buyers and sellers — bank dealers trade with
one another both directly and through foreign
exchange brokers.1
Standard models of exchange-rate determina-
tion concentrate on relatively long-run aspects,
such as purchasing power parity. While micro-
structure theory cannot address these issues
directly, it can illuminate a more narrowly fo-
cused array of institutional concerns, such as
price information, the matching of buyers and
sellers, and optimal dealer pricing policies. De-
spite the substantial literature on microstructure,
little attention has been paid to the particular
microstructure of the foreign exchange market.2
‘Similar arrangements exist for other securities—for exam-
ple, the federal funds market and the secondary market
for Treasury securities—but these too have been relatively
neglected in the literature.
2The shaded insert on the opposite page provides a context
in which the microstructural approach can be compared
with more traditional approaches to market efficiency.
Following some early articles by Demsetz (1968), Tinic
(1972) and Tinic and West (1972), Garman (1976) per-
formed the crucial task of defining market microstructure
as an independent area of the literature, thus focusing the
debate. Since then, market microstructure has burgeoned,
led by Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1978a,
1978b, 1981, 1983), Amihud and Mendelson (1980, 1986,
1988), Stoll (1978, 1985, 1989) and Ho and Stoll (1980,
1981). See also Beja and Hakansson (1977), Cohen,
Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1980), Cohen,
Maier, Ness, Okuda, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1977), Ami-
hud, Ho, and Schwartz (1985), Schreiber and Schwartz
(1986), Schwartz (1988) and Cohen and Schwartz (1989).
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979, 1986) and
Stoll (1985) have surveyed the microstructure literature.
In addition to the early note by Allen (1977), very recently
there have appeared some microstructural studies of the
foreign exchange market: Bossaerts and Hillion (1991),
Lyons (1991), Rai (1991) and Flood (1991). There is also
an empirical literature measuring the determinants of the
bid-ask spread in the foreign exchange market. See Black
(1989), Wei (1991) and Glassman (1987) as well as the
references therein. Because the focus of this article is on
microstructure theory, such empirical studies receive little
attention here.
Finally, although a consideration of the results of laborato-
ry experiments would expand the scope of this paper to
unwieldy dimensions, their role in establishing the sensitiv-
ity of market behavior to institutional factors must at least
be acknowledged; see Plott (1982, 1991) for an in-
troduction.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUISI 53
S ~ ~., ~ N .— —\ / ~c ‘Ti~_ ~. ~ ~4 C,’ ~‘ ~/ < /\ ~ /~ ~~
S ~/C~/~~t ~ ~ .~ ~ ~~ <‘/‘~Cfr~/’ ~? ~
4
çY~, ~ ~ // ~
~
S ~~ <~ , ~~ . ; ..\ , ~~ / ~/ ~ ~ ~ 7/ ~ ~ “Ye ~~ /~ “
I ~ H~ ~ C ~:i~ , : ci:: ~1c~’: 1/
// , .~ < ~/\~ ~ ~ /~ \ , ~ /~/~ y ~~~ . ~ c ~‘
I ~ ::~“ ~‘ I ~ ~ ~.,t. .~ 4~~// ~ / ~ ~ / “ ~.
: ~~~ I~ ~[T~:1 ~~
~ ~ ~ ~ < .c\~~ ~ ‘ ~. ~ ~ ~ ~ </ ~~ ~ ~ ,\ ~
I
~ ‘ ~ ‘ ~ ~ ,~ &~ ~ ‘“< ~‘ ~ ~4’w\ ~ ,\ ~ ,, ~ .~ ~ / ~ ~ ,~ ~~
~ ,...~., ~../.4\.:~t~r ~ ~ ~ .( 1iz:,~ ~‘ ~ < ~~‘1 ~ ‘~ \~ ~ <..~ ‘
a ~ ~ p / ~ < /~ ~ ~. \~v ‘ ~ ~ :~ ~ ~ ‘ ~ \ a ~ /~ ~\ *c~ ~/~c~j ~*/ ~c~: .~ ~ ~~ /,~
S ~ \~~// ~4( ~ ~ // ~~ f, ~ ~J:::~?:/\ ~ ~~C “~ /‘~A \~ , ‘/ ~
j ~i~ ~ ~ a , . ~~ ~ ‘ ~ ~ ~ / .1 .~ ~, ~ ~~ .4~/ , ~\
a ~ t~’ ~ ~4*t , ~ ~-< ~ ~ ~ ; a /~d ~bSJ.~ ‘~‘z~ ~ 4!øv ./ /~ ~ ~. S~ ~p ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
S N N “* ~ ~*v ~
11 N~ N ~ 1* ~N/~/: ~id ~~
S /~\~ ~~ ~ ~ /7\~ // / /~ —/ ~, iS ~
N ~ ~ ~. N ~N .~ ~ ~ N ~ h~t~ ~.
~ —~ // ~ ‘:~ ~~ ~ ‘~: ~~f4
// ~‘ : i1~t ‘~ ~~ ~/ , I ~ t~!sI~* ~ N~ ~1/N~‘ ,~ ~ : ~ N ~
0
r ~nnptneJ NN N
~ /~/~ ‘~/~ ~ ~ ~\N~/~\\ N~
~ / ~ *&#c+ ‘ ~ ~ /;4 I 0 , ‘ t,~ ~~/\\ ~\\
I N tiasi ~ // \<\ ~ /. ,. SaSw~oSL1ktrstus~.
I N ~ ~t*~iS aø~ ‘~ ~ / \/ / ~ ,, ~
~ N ~~tj4boDX~ t,,~ 4~Ø4fJØfl N
a \~Nt\Sc :: ~ ~ tp*s’ ~ ‘ ~ ‘, ~: , N 4~ ~ ‘ \/ \ /~ ~ I N \/ ~ sastt NA 4I~ts*twb~ / N N/N ~ a~ )~ostra~fl N N V / / V ,.N,,,,, ,~ ,,V N NN N N \N NN
/ t/N~ ‘~ ~~/C/ ‘~/“/\./.‘




N NN N N .1’ / ~. / N SS stWaat t%Sflot S NN N N / IN NN N
N NN N
NN N “N N NN
N/\~~ N’~N’N ‘~\~\~/ ,NNNN\\ ,NIN
S ~ N N, N N’ ~ N N~, N’ N
N N NN NNIN/\NN..\ ‘‘N/¼’N~N/.\ N N N NNN N
“N N NN NNN N’ ‘N N ~, N,\N\N/’ ~N N ‘NN N
I ~NN NN N,NN~~NN\\ININN,\~
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 199154
This paper examines the extant literature on
market microstructure to determine how it
might be applied to the foreign exchange
market.
The paper begins with a brief description of
the foreign exchange market. Aspects of the
literature concerned with institutional details
are addressed second, noting how such details
can affect the performance of the market. Next,
the literature dealing with behavioral details, es-
pecially the communication and interpretation
of price information, is considered. Finally, the
interaction of institutional and behavioral fac-
tors, notably the bid-ask spread, is discussed.
INSTITUTIONAL BASICS OF THE
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET
The foreign exchange market is the interna-
tional market in which buyers and sellers of
currencies “meet.”3 It is largely decentralized:
the participants (classified as market-makers,
brokers and customers) are physically separated
from one another; they communicate via tele-
phone, telex and computer network. Trading
volume is large, estimated at $128.9 billion for
the U.S. market in April 1989. Most of this trad-
ing was between bank market-makers.~
The market is dominated by the market-makers
at commercial and investment banks, who trade
currencies with each other both directly and
through foreign exchange brokers (see figure IL”
Market-makers, as the name suggests, “make a
market” in one or more currencies by providing
bid and ask prices upon demand. A broker ar-
ranges trades by keeping a “book” of market-
maker’s limit orders — that is, orders to buy (al-
ternatively, to sell) a specified quantity of for-
eign currency at a specified price — from which
he quotes the best bid and ask orders upon re-
quest. The best bid and ask quotes on a broker’s
book are together called the broker’s “inside
spread.” The other participants in the market
are the customers of the market-making banks,
who generally use the market to complete
transactions in international trade, and central
banks, who may enter the market to move ex-
Figure 1




change rates or simply to complete their own
international transactions. Market-makers may
trade for their own account — that is, they may
maintain a long or short position in a foreign
currency — and require significant capitalization
for that purpose. Brokers do not contact cus-
tomers and do not deal on their own account;
instead, they profit by charging a fee for the
service of bringing market-makers together.
The mechanics of trading differ substantially
between brokered transactions and direct deals.
In the direct market, banks contact each other.
The bank receiving a call acts as a market-maker
for the currency in question, providing a two-
way quote (bid and ask) for the bank placing
the call. A direct deal might go as follows:
Mongobank: “Mongobank with a dollar-mark
please?”
(Mongobank requests a spot market quote
for U.S. dollars (USD) against German marks
(DEM).)
3For more thorough descriptions of the workings of the for-
eign exchange market, see Burnham (1991), Chrystal
(1984), Kubarych (1983) and Riehl and Rodriguez (1983).
4See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1989a) and Bank
for International Settlements (815) (1990). Extending this
figure over 251 trading days per year, this implies a trad-
ing volume of roughly $32 trillion for all of 1989. Volume
has roughly doubled every three years for the past
decade.
5Federal Reserve Bank of New York (l989a) lists 162
market-making institutions (148 are commercial banks) and
14 brokers; an earlier study, Federal Reserve Bank of New




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUIS1 55
Loans ‘n Things: “20-30”
(Loans n’ Things will buy dollars at 2.1020
DEM/USD and sell dollars at 2.1030 DEM/USD
—the 2.10 part of the quote is understood.)
Mongohank: “Two mine.”
(Mongobank buys $2,000,000 for DEM
4,206,000 at 2.1030 DEMIUSD, for payment
two business days later. The quantity traded
is usually one of a handful of “customary
amounts.”)
Loans ‘n Things: “My marks to Loans ‘n
Things Frankfurt.”
(Loans n’ Things requests that payment of
marks be made to their account at their
Frankfurt branch. Payment will likely be
made via SWIFT.)e
Mongohank: ‘(My dollars to Mongobank New
York.”
(Mongobank requests that payment of dol-
lars be made to them in New York. Payment
will most likely be made via CHIPS.)7
Spot transactions are made for “value date”
(payment date) two business days later to allow
settlement arrangements to be made with cor-
respondents or branches in other time zones.
This period is extended when a holiday inter-
venes in one of the countries involved. Payment
occurs in a currency’s home country.
The other method of interbank trading is
brokered transactions. Brokers collect limit
orders from bank market-makers. A limit order
is an offer to buy (alternatively to sell) a speci-
fied quantity at a specified price. I,imit orders
remain with the broker until withdrawn by the
market-maker-
The advantages of brokered trading include
the rapid dissemination of orders to other
market-makers, anonymity in quoting, and the
freedom not to quote to other market-makers
on a reciprocal basis, which can be required in
the direct market. Anonymity allows the quoting
bank to conceal its identity and thus its inten-
tions; it also requires that the broker know who
is an acceptable counterparty for whom. Limit
eThe Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommu-
nication (SWIFT) is an electronic message network. In this
case, it conveys a standardized payment order to a Ger-
man branch or correspondent bank, which, in turn, effects
the payment as a local interbank transfer in Frankfurt.
~TheClearing House for Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS) is a private interbank payments system in New
York City.
orders are also provided in part as a courtesy
to the brokers as part of an ongoing business
relationship that makes the market more liquid.
Because his limit order is often a market-maker’s
first indication of general price shift, Brooks
likens the posting of an order with a broker “to
sticking out the chin so as to be acquainted
with the moment that the fight starts.”8 Schwartz
points out that posting a limit order extends a
free option to other traders.~
A market-maker who calls a broker for a quote
gets the broker’s inside spread, along with the
quantities of the limit orders. A typical call to a
broker might proceed as follows:
Mongoank: “What is sterling, please?”
(Mongobank requests the spot quote for
U.S. dollars against British pounds (GBP).)
Fonnieister: “1 deal 40-42, one by two.”
(Fonmeister Brokerage has quotes to buy
£1,000,000 at 1.7440 USD/GBP, and to sell
£2,000,000 at 1.7442 USD/GBP)
Mongobank; “I sell one at 40, to whom?”
(Mongobank hits the bid for the quantity
stated. Mongobank could have requested a
different amount, which would have re-
quired additional confirmation from the bid-
ding bank.)
Fonmeisten [A pause while the deal is reported
to and confirmed by Loans ‘n
Things] “Loans ‘n Things London.”
(Fonmeister confirms the deal and reports the
counterparty to Mongobank. Payment ar-
rangements will be made and confirmed
separately by the respective back offices. The
broker’s back office will also confirm the
trade with the banks.)
Value dates and payment arrangements are the
same as in the direct dealing case. In addition to
the payment to the counterparty bank, the banks
involved share the broket-age fee. These fees are
negotiable in the United States. They are also
quite low: roughly $20 per million dollars trans-
acted.’°
tSee Brooks (1985), p. 25.
9See Schwartz (1988), p. 239.




















The final category of participants in the for-
eign exchange market is the corporate cus-
tomers of the market-making banks. Customers
deal only with the market-makers. They never go
through brokers, who cannot adequately monitor
their creditworthiness. Typically, a customer
transacts with a bank with which it already has a
well-established relationship, so that corporate
creditwor-thiness is not a concern for the bank’s
foreign exchange desk, and trustworthiness is not
an issue for the customer. The mechanics of cus-
tomer trading are similar to those of direct deal-
ing between market-makers. A customer requests
a quote, and the bank makes a two-way market;
the customer then decides to buy, sell or pass.
The chief difference between this and an inter-
bank relationship is that the customer is not ex-
pected ever to reciprocate by making a market.
Participants in the foreign exchange market also
deal for future value dates. Such dealing com-
poses the forward markets. Active forward mar-
kets exist for a few heavily traded currencies and
for several time intervals corresponding to active-
ly dealt maturities in the money market. Markets
can also be requested and made for other ma-
turities, however. Since the foreign exchange
market is unregulated, standard contract speci-
fications are matters of tradition and con-
venience, and they can be modified by the
transacting agents.
Forward transactions generally occur in two
different ways: outright and swap. An outright
forward transaction is what the name implies, a
contract for an exchange of currencies at some
future value date. “Outrights” generally occur
only between market-making banks and their
commercial clients. The interbank market for out-
rights is very small, because outright trading im-
plies an exchange rate risk until maturity of the
contract. When outrights are concluded for a
commercial client, they are usually hedged im-
mediately by swapping the forward position to
spot. This removes the exchange rate risk and
leaves only interest rate risk.
A swap is simply a combination of two simul-
taneous trades: an outright forward contract and
an opposing spot deal. For example, a bank might
“swap in” six-month yen by simultaneously buying






yen. Such a swap might be used to hedge an out-
right purchase of six-month yen from a bank cus-
tomer.’1 In effect, the swapping bank is
borrowing yen for the six months of the outright
deal. The foreign exchange market-maker swaps
in yen — rather than simply borrow yen on a
time deposit — because banks maintain separate
foreign exchange and money market accounts for
administrative reasons. Swapping is generally the
preferred means of forward dealing (see figures 2
and 3).
In practice, the vast majority of foreign ex-
change transactions involve the U.S. dollar and
some other currency. The magnitude of U.S. for-
eign trade and investment flows implies that, for
almost any other currency, the bilateral dollar ex-
change markets will have the largest volume.
Consequently, the dollar markets are the most li-
quid. The possibility of triangular arbitrage en-
forces the law of one price for the cross rates.
The upshot is that liquidity considerations out-
weigh transaction costs. A German wanting
“Hedging an outright purchase of currency with an oppos-
ing swap deal still leaves an open spot purchase of the













pounds, for example, will typically convert
marks to dollars and then dollars to pounds,
rather than trading marks for pounds directly.
Though this is especially true in the American
market, it holds for foreign markets as well.
The microstructure literature is by nature
market-specific, and much of it concerns U. S.
equity markets. This specificity has the advan-
tage of realism, but it makes the immediate ap-
plicability of some microstructural models to the
foreign exchange market questionable. The first
task is to define some basic microstructural con-
cepts, identifying where the foreign exchange
market fits into the context they provide. Such
a taxonomy is important, because one of the
fundamental lessons of the microstructure lit-
12A similar situation obtains on the New York Stock Ex-
change, where specialists act as either brokers or market-
makers, depending on the level of activity in the market.
135ee Wolinsky (1990), p. 1. He goes onto analyze theoreti-
cally the difference in the price discovery process between
centralized and decentralized markets. Schwartz (1988),
pp. 426-35, refers to centralization as “spatial consoli-
dation.”
I CLASSIFYING MARKETS
erature is that institutional differences can af-
fect the efficiency of pricing and allocation.
As described above, the foreign exchange
market combines two disparate auction struc-
tures for the same commodity: the interbank
direct market and the brokered market. Defying
a naive application of institutional Darwinism,
whereby only the fitter of the two systems
would survive, these trading methods appear to
coexist comfortably.” The direct market can be
classified as a decentralized, continuous, open-
bid, double-auction market. The brokered mar-
ket is a quasi-centralized, continuous, limit-book,
single-auction market. The meanings of these
classifications are explained below.
Centralization
In a centralized market, “trades are carried
out at publicly announced prices and all traders
have access to the same trading opportunities.”
In a decentralized market, in contrast, “prices
are quoted and transactions are concluded in
private meetings among agents.”” A New York
Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) specialist system is a
centralized market; the interbank direct market
for foreign exchange is a decentralized one.
The distinction between centralized and de-
centralized markets might seem to provide a
neat dichotomy of possible market structures.
The multiplicity of brokers in the foreign ex-
change market violates this simple taxonomy,
however. Each foreign exchange broker accum-
ulates a subset of market-makers’ limit orders.
This network of “brokerage nodes” is as dif-
ferent from a fully centralized system as it is
from a fully decentralized one. This arrange-
ment is labeled here as “quasi-centralized.”
Most microstructural studies have confined
themselves to centralized markets, especially the
NYSE’s specialist system and the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
(NASDAQ) System on the over-the-counter (OTC)
market.” Although there are a number of im-
portant decentralized markets, including the in-
terbank direct foreign exchange market, rela-
‘4For models of specialist systems, see Demsetz (1968), Tin-
ic (1972), Garman (1976), Bradfield (1979), Amihud and
Mendelson (1980), Conroy and Winkler (1981), Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) and Sirri (1989). For studies of the
OTC market, see Tinic and West (1972), Benston and


















tively few studies have focused on the impact
of decentralization.
There is some evidence that differences in
the degree of centralization between various
markets cause differences in market perfor-
mance. Garbade, in studying the largely decen-
tralized ‘!‘reasury securities market, concludes
that because brokerage tends to centralize
trading and price information, it “uses time
more efficiently,””eliminates the most important
arbitrages,” and benefits dealers by ensuring that
orders are executed according to price priority.”
The efficiency gains of centralized price infor-
mation may imply economies of scale and, thus,
a natural monopoly for brokers in securities
markets. This is entirely consistent with the text-
book presentation of the relativel greater opera-
tional efficiency of centralized markets.” Thus,
the fact that a number of brokers service the
foreign exchange market seems to represent a
discrepancy between theory and reality. Brokers
do communicate among themselves, however, to
eliminate the possibility of arbitrage between
limit order books. While this helps explain the
multiplicity of brokers, it does not fully resolve
the issue of decentralization in the interbank
direct market.
Temporal Consolidation
The distinction between a continuous market
and a call market involves what Schwartz refers
to as the degree of “temporal consolidation.””
In a call market, trading occurs at pre-appointed
times (the “calls”), with arriving transaction ord-
ers detained until the next call for execution. In
continuous markets, like the foreign exchange
market, trading occurs at its own pace, and
transaction orders are processed as they arrive.
A 1-ange of intermediate arrangements falls he-
t~veenthese two extremes.
“See Garbade (1978). p. 497.
“The textbook argument counts trips to market. Briefly, if
there are N traders, then a total of N trips to a central
marketplace are required for each to haggle with everyone
else; to pair them bilaterally requires a total of N(N-I)!2
trips. If trips are costly, then centralization is more ef-
ficient.
“See Schwartz (1988), pp. 435-47. Garman (1976), pp. 257’
58, also describes continuous and call markets; he refers
to these as asynchronous and synchronous markets,
respectively.
“See Hahn (1984), Negishi (1962), Beja and Hakansson
(1977), as well as the references therein.
“A continuous market cannot be viewed as a continuum of
infinitesimally lived call markets. Clearing supply and de-
Most rnicroeconorriic models assume call mar-
kets. In a Walrasian thtonnemerir model, for cx-
ample, an auctioneer calls out a series of prices
and receives buy and sell orders at each price.
When a price is found for which the quantities
supplied and demanded are equal, all transactions
are consummated at that price. Interestingly
enough, Walras based this price discovery
model on the mechanics of the Paris Bourse.
Temporal consolidation can affect the perfor-
mance of a market. Theoretical work indicates
how continuous trading can alter- allocations,
the process of price discovery and even the ulti-
mate equilibrium price.” The basic thrust of
these arguments is that, with continuous ttading,
earlier transactions satisfy some consumer’s and
producers, causing shifts in supply and detnand
that affect prices for later transactions. As a
result, the Pareto-efficiency characteristic of
Walrasian equilibria does not necessarily obtain
in continuous markets.”
On the other hand, the periodic batching of
orders that occurs in a call market also has dis-
advantages. The difference in time between ord-
er placement and execution can impose real
costs on investors. A recurring argument in the
literature is the willingness of investor-s to pat’
more — a liquidity premium — for the ability to
trade immediately. Similarly, periodic calls delay
any information conveyed by prices until the
time of the call, introducing price uncet-taintv in
the period between the calls.
In sum, a trade-off exists between the alloca-
tional efficiency of the nearly ‘Nalrasian call
market system and the informational efficiency
and immediacy of the continuous market sys-
tem.20 it is not clear whether the microstruc-
ture of the foreign exchange market represents
a globally optimal balance of these relative ad-
mand in each such call market would require an infinite
trading volume over the course of a day. Cohen and
Schwartz (1989) recommend an electronic order-routing
system for the stock exchanges. to facilitate the placement
and revision of orders, This would encourage additional
trading volume, making more frequent calls feasible.
“See Stoll (1985), p. 72, and especially Schwartz (1988),
pp. 442-53, for a more thorough exposition of the pros and
cons of temporal consolidation. Intermediate arrangements
are also possible. For example, Schwartz argues that
many of the problems caused by infrequent batching in a
call market might be overcome by expanding access to
the market with computer technology, whereby the in-
creased number of traders would allow for more frequent
calls.
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vantages. A persistent deviation from optimality
might be explained, for example, by arguing
that the allocational benefits of a call market
system are a public good.
Communication of Prices
The terms “open-bid” and “limit-book” refer to
ways in which price information is communi-
cated. In an open-bid market — the open outcry
system on the futures exchanges, for example
— offers to buy or sell at a specified price are
announced to all agents in the market. At the
opposite extreme, in a sealed-bid market, orders
are known only to the entity placing the order
and perhaps to a disinterested auctioneer.
Direct trading in foreign exchange approxi-
mates the standard open-bid structure. The
salient difference between the foreign exchange
market and the standard arrangement is the
bilateral pairing of participants in the foreign
exchange market. In principle, any participant
can contact a market-maker at any time for a
price quote. The bilateral nature of such con-
tacts and the time consumed by each contact
together imply, however, that all participants
cannot be simultaneously informed of the cur-
rent quotes of a market-maker. This practical
constraint on the dissemination of price infor-
mation is significant: it introduces the possibility
of genuine arbitrage, that is, of finding two
market-makers whose current bid-ask spreads
do not overlap.
The limit order book, which is used by both
foreign exchange brokers and stock exchange
specialists, is another intermediate form of price
communication. Although it would be possible
in principle for foreign exchange brokerage
books to be fully open for public inspection, in
practice only certain orders — namely, the best
bid and ask on each book — are revealed to
market-makers, while the others remain con-
cealed. As in the direct market, market-makers
must contact brokers bilaterally to get these “in-
side spreads.” Knowledge of the concealed limit
orders would be of speculative value to market-
makers, because an imbalanced book suggests
that large future price movements are more
likely in one direction than the other.
More generally, price communication is inti-
mately related to the role of market-makers as
2lThi5 term is due to Demsetz (1968), p. 35. Tinic (1972),
p. 79, calls in “liquidity services.”
providers of “predictable immediacy.” Market
participants are willing to pay a liquidity pre-
mium, usually embedded in a market-maker’s
spread, for the reduction in search costs im-
plied by constant access to a counterparty. The
costs of “finding” the other side of a transaction
can be further broken down into the liquidity
concession, the cost of communicating the in-
formation and the cost of waiting for potential
counterparties to respond.22 Other things equal,
an efficient system of price communication is
one that minimizes such transaction costs. While
the communication of price information is a
central function of securities markets, the fact
that the systems of price communication in the
foreign exchange market are not fully central-
ized suggests that these systems do not represent
a cost-minimizing arrangement.
Structure of Prices
The terms “double-auction” and “single-auction”
refer to the nature of the prices quoted. In a
double-auction market, certain participants pro-
vide prices on both sides of the market, that is,
both bid and ask prices. Participants providing
double-auction quotes upon demand are known
as market-makers, and they must have sufficient
capitalization to back up their quotes. In a single-
auction market, prices are specified either’ to
buy or to sell, but not both. In the foreign ex-
change market, market-makers provide double-
auction prices, while brokers try to aggregate
single-auction quotes into two-way (inside)
spreads. A broker’s book may occasionally be
empty on one or both sides. Rather than make
a market in such cases, the broker provides,
respectively, a single-auction quote or none at all.
Thus, whether double or single-auction prices
are quoted depends largely on whether the
agent quoting prices is providing market-making
services or simply attempting to acquire (or sell)
the commodity. This issue is related to the
degree of centralization in the market. The
absence of market-makers in a single-auction
market, together with the presence of search
costs, results in a tendency toward centraliza-
tion of price information, thus facilitating the
search for a counterparty. Inversely, decentrali-
zation of price information leads to a tendency



















toward double-auction prices, again to facilitate
the search for a counterparty.”
MODELING TRADERS’ BEHAVIOR
The microstructure liter’ature extends well be-
yond a simple description of market institutions.
Modeling the behavior of market participants is
central to almost all discussions of micro-
structure. Although numerous approaches to
such modeling have been taken, two common
concerns are of special interest. These are the
treatment of price information by market par-
ticipants, and determination of the bid-ask spread.
The latter raises the interrelated issues of inven-
tory and quantity transacted.
Price Expectations
Modeling the interpretation of price informa-
tion is a crucial step in constrtcting microstruc-
tural models of price discovery.” Many diverse
approaches have been taken in such modeling.
An almost universal simplification is to model
securities markets in partial equilibrium, so that
prices are not determined endogeneously in the
traditional general equilibrium sense. This allows
the modeler to focus on the microstructure’s
finer details. Another common simplification is
to assume that agents ignore the impact of their
own behavior on the market.”
Rather than explicitly model such forces as
general equilibrium or recursive beliefs, models
posit probability distributions that produce the
prices of orders in the market. Modelers have
included randomness at one or both of two lev-
els, depending on their focus. First, order
prices can be generated by objective distribu-
tions, that is, by stochastic processes exogenous
to the lnarket. For example, there may he a
stochastic process that generates the “true”
equilibrium price. Second, probability models of
palticipants’ subjective beliefs about prices can
be used. Cont-oy and Winkler, for example, at-
tribute subjective normal price distributions to
market-makers, who use Bayesian updating to
learn about the prices of incoming limitorders.”
Objective processes can coexist with subjective
beliefs about those processes. Harsanyi suggests
a consistency requirement for the subjective
price distributions of multiple agents; these dis-
tributions are each equated with a conditional
distribution of a single distribution known to all.”
Models can be further classified according to
how they telate supply and demand. In particu-
lar, there are both models with single price
processes and with dual price processes. In dual
price models, purchase orders (whether market
or limit orders) are generated by one process,
while sale order-s are generated by another.”
‘I’he salient point here is that purchase and sale
orders come from independent distributions.
‘rhis independence is especially clear in Conroy
and Winkler, where the distributional assump-
tions are explicit; there, independence implies
that any sequence of buy orders, regardless of
their prices arid quantities, has no effect on the
subjective probability of a sell order at any price.
Statistical independence implicitly restricts the
ways in which orders can be generated. Put--
chase and sale orders are somehow motivated
independently, although the cause of this
separation is not always specified. Statistical in-
dependence is not a necessary component of a
dual price process, however. Cohen, Maier,
Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981), for example, as-
sume that actual market hid and ask prices are
“Note that the converse does not appear to hold. That is,
centralization does not tend to eliminate double-auction
quoting. For example, the NASDAO system on the OTC
stock market centralizes price information while still sup-
porting numerous market-makers for every stock.
“Notably, the term “price” is generally too inexact in a
microstructurat context. One must often distinguish at a
minimum between quoted prices, transaction prices and
equilibrium prices. There are also reservation prices,
market-clearing prices and closing prices (see Schwartz
(1988), chapter 9, for the distinction between equilibrium
and clearing prices). If unspecified here, the intended defi-
nition should be clear from the context.
“The alternative, which dates at least to Keynes’ “beauty
contest,” is recursive beliefs, in which an agent considers
the feedback of her own actions on the beliefs of others,
and thence how the behavior on the other agents might af-
fect her own beliefs, etc. See Keynes (1936), p. 156. The
limiting case—an infinite recursion of beliefs—presumes
extreme informational and comoutational resources on the
part of agents, and models based on it are usually intrac-
table. Intermediate approaches allowing a finite degree of
recursion must somehow justify the truncation of recursive
beliefs, just as the standard model of atomistic agents al-
lows no beliefs about beliefs and is justified by an as-
sumption on the relative size of individual agents.
“See shaded insert on opposite page.
“See Harsanyi (1982), especially chapter 9, and the refer-
ences therein. His consistency requirement identifies a
unique equilibrium for the game.
~ market order is an order to trade at the best price avail-
able; a limit order specifies a price. These models
represent a strain of the literature that was pioneered by
Demsetz using straightforward supply and demand sched-
ules (see shaded insert on page 63). Similar approaches
were later taken by Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendet-
son (1980) and Conroy and Winkler (1981), among others.
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independent Poisson processes and give inves-
tors joint subjective distributions over those
prices. For the latter distributions, probabilistic
independence of bid and ask prices is not ex-
plicitly required. Black (1989) models quantities
(independent of prices) of market orders. Quan-
tities supplied and demanded are drawn from
different distributions, but the distributions are
constrained to have the same mean. Garbade
(1978), on the other hand, assumes a single,
unknown and fixed equilibrium price, around
which market-makers set their spreads. Incom-
ing buy and sell orders arrive via random
processes whose mean arrival rates depend on
the difference between the quoted bid (or ask)
price and the exogenous equilibrium price and,
thus, are not independent.
The most common alternative to separate pur-
chase and sale processes is to model prices as
some function of a single scalar process. This
approach is in the spirit of the efficient markets
literature, which posits a unique value for a
security conditional on the available informa-
tion, Ross (1987) points out that this approach
can be regarded conceptually as a special case
of the dual price process, with supply and de-
mand infinitely elastic at a common price. Many
authors reveal their theoretical roots by using
terminology drawn from the literature on effi-
cient markets. Thus, for example, Barnea des-
cribes a stock’s “intrinsic value,” which follows a
random walk.” Similarly, Copeland and Galai
posit a “‘true’ underlying asset value - -- known
(cx ante) to all market participants.”° In con-
trast1 Garbade’s (1978) exogenous equilibrium
price is unknown.
It is possible to extend the single price ap-
proach beyond the efficient markets tradition
by modeling the value of a security subjectively
rather than as an objective fact. Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), for example, begin with an ex-
ogenous random value representing the consen-
sus value of a stock given all public information.
Investors do not act on this exogenous value
directly; instead, they act on their expectation
of it, conditional on their information set. Ho
and Stoll personalize price expectations in a
similar fashion:”
We take the dealer’s opinion of the “true” price of
the stock to be exogenously determined by his in-
formation set and ask how the dealer prices rela-
tive to his “true” price...
This subjectivization of the pricing process is
significant, because it allows for heterogeneous
expectations and thus for more realistic model-
ing of price discovery.
Research into the microstructure of the for-
eign exchange market should presume such het-
erogeneity among market-makers. There are
numerous market-makers for foreign exchange:
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRB-NY)
(1989a) lists 162 dealing institutions in the U.S.
interbank market. There would be little point in
such superfluity if all market-makers were iden-
tical. Furthermore, it is well known that “taking
a view,” that is, speculating on future prices, is
routine for many participants.32 To omit this
heterogeneity from a model is to ignore an im-
portant characteristic of the market.
The large proportion of market-makers in the
foreign exchange market has another important
modeling implication. It implies that a single-
price process is more appropriate as a theoreti-
cal representation of agents’ expectations. Mar-
ket-makers consistently face other market-makers,
who can hold positive or negative inventories of
foreign currency with equal ease. A quote that
is “off the market” on the high side will be hit
(i.e., traded upon) just as surely as a quote that
is off on the low side. This is also true of cus-
tomers, who normally enter the market with a
predilection to either buy or sell. As Burnham
notes:’3
The customer knows that if the first marketmaker
is too far off the market price, he can unexpected-
ly take the other side of the quote and resell the
position to a second marketmaker.
The point is that the market-maker must expect
to be penalized for underestimating as well as
overestimating his counterparty’s valuation of
the currency. From the perspective of the mar-
ket-maker, who quotes a spread and observes a
response, the forces determining short-run ef-
fective demand and supply are not merely re-
lated, but indistinguishable.
“See Barnea (1974), pp. 512-14.
‘°SeeCopeland and Galai (1983), p. 1458.
“See Ho and Stoll (1981), p. 48. For a similar example, see
Stoll (1978), especially p. 1136.
“See, for example, Kubarych (1983), p. 29, or Burnham
(1991), p. 139.
“See Burnham (1991), p. 136.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































perative of arbitrage avoidance must he re-
garded as the first priority in individual market-
niaker pricing, to which all other factors (e.g.,
purchasing power parity) must be subordinated.
Market-makers’ Bid-Ask Spreads
‘l’he bid-ask spread has attracted consider-able
interest in the literature on market microstruc-
ture. The complexity of modeling the spread is
largely because it requires incorporating a sub-
stantial amount of institutional detail. At a facile
theoretical level,, a market-maker’s spread appears
to be a direct violation of the latv of one price,
since it assigns two prices to the same com-
modity. Several explanations have been offered
to resolve this seeming inconsistency. They can
be roughly categorized as involving the cost of
dealer services, the cost of adverse selection and
the cost of holding inventory.”
The dealer services argument can be traced
back at least as far as Stigler (1964), who argues
that stock exchange specialists charge a “job-
ber’s turn” as compensation for the costs of act-
ing as a specialist. The analysis of dealer services
was formalized by Demsetz (1968), who identi-
fied “predictable immediacy” as the particular
service for which investors are willing to pay.
This identification hints at the complex question
of what liquidity is and where it comes fi-orn. In
a busy market, liquidity is a public good: a con-
tinuous stream of buyers and sellers generates
predictable immediacy as a by-product of their
trading.
‘l’he determinants of the level of compensation
are themselves a topic of debate. Stigler argues
that, because centralization of exchange limits
fixed costs and aggregates separate transaction
orders into less risky actuarial order flows, it
implies economies of scale and thus a natural
monopoly for market-making.’” Smidt (1971)
counters that barriers to entry among NYSE
specialists allow them to exact monopoly rents
from other investors. In his view, the natural
monopoly argument, while used as an apology
for barriers to entry, remains unsupported em-
pirically: “There is no empirical evidence to sup-
port the proposition that lmarket-making] is, in
fact, a natut-al monopoly.”~Indeed, if market-
making is a natural monopoly, barriers to entry
should he unnecessary.
The foreign exchange market has no apparent
barriers to entry other than the need for suffi-
cient capitalization. It also has no apparent bar-
riers to exit. The market supports a large and
mci-easing number of competing market-makers.
Unless it can be sho~-vnthat there is some sub-
tle restriction in the foreign exchange market
that prevents consolidation of the market-making
function, one must conclude that market-making
per se is not a natural monopoly.” The multi-
tude of market-makers also implies that they
cannot earn monopoly rents by embedding a
premium for predictable immediacy in the
spread, although the spread may still cover the
costs of processing orders.
Other research suggests that a market-maker’s
job is more complex than the mere sale of
counterparty services. A second explanation for
the bid-ask spread — adverse selection — can
he traced to Bagehot (1971). He starts with
“liquidity-motivated transactors” who pay the
market-maker the price of the spread in ex-
change for the service of predictable immedi-
acy. The market-maker also confronts traders
who have inside information, however, and who
can therefore speculate profitably at the expense
of the market-maket-.” The market-maker must
charge everyone a widet- spread to compensate
for losses to the information-motivated traders.
Because of the relatively abstract nature of
currencies as commodities, it is difficult to con-
struct examples of ‘‘inside” information on
foreign exchange rates. One exception is money
supply announcements, which, if known before
“This is essentially the same taxonomy as provided by Bar-
nea and Logue (1975), although they use the terms
‘liquidity theory,” “adversary theory,” and “dynamic
price/inventory adlustment theory,” respectively.
‘“See Stigler (1964), p. 129.
‘7See Smidt (1971), p. 64.
“For example, in the context of the OTC stock market, Ben-
ston and Hagerman (1974), p. 362, conlecture that. “deal-
ers may face positively sloped marginal cost curves which
shift down as industry output increases.” The idea is that
market-making per se is not a natural monopoly, even
though the industry as a whole experiences economies ot
scale. Hamilton (1976) also addresses the natural monopo-
ly question; Reinganum (1990) provides evidence on li-
quidity premia for NYSE vs. NASDAQ stocks.
“This situation is called adverse selection, because, in a
market with competing market-makers, the one who gets
the insider’s business is a loser rather than a winner.
Bagehot also posits a third class of investors, who only
think they have inside information; they speculate, but lose
on average, and are indistinguishable to the market-maker
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publicly distributed, might provide a basis for
profitable speculation. Another form of informa-
tion that can be construed as inside information
is knowledge of an arbitrage opportunity. Con-
sider a hypothetical market in which there are
numerous decentralized market-makers who do
not quote spreads, but single prices at which
they are willing both to buy and sell. Unless
there were a perfect consensus among the mar-
ket-makers on the value of the foreign currency,
all of them would be vulnerable to arbitrage. A
decentralized market makes a perfect consensus
difficult to achieve. Without centralizing price
information, it is impossible to know if no arbi-
trage opportunities exist. A bid-ask spread, in
contrast, allows a market-maker to include an
error tolerance in her prices, thus facilitating a
price consensus: it is easier to get bid-ask
spreads to overlap than to get scalar prices to
coincide. The spread also provides the mar-
ket-maker with some degree of protection
from adverse selection in the form of arbitrage.
The bid-ask spread is also affected by invento-
ry considerations. This idea dates back at least
as far as Barnea and Logue (1975)A°The notion
of a desired inventory level for the market-
maker underlies all of these models. In the
simplest case, the desired level is set at zero,
and a constant spread is shifted up and down
on a price scale to equalize the probability of
receiving a purchase order with that of receiv-
ing a sale order. The result is that the expected
change in Inventory is always equal to zero, and
(with all trades for one round lot) the inventory
level follows a simple random walk.
An undesirable implication of random-walk
models of inventory is the inevitable bankruptcy
of the market-maker. Finite capitalization levels
for market-makers impose upper and lower
bounds on allowable inventories. Because inven-
tory follows a random walk, with probability
one It will reach either its upper or lower bound
in a finite number of trades.” The dynamic op-
timization models of Bradfield (1979), Amihud
and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1981)
resolve this problem. They conclude that a
market-maker, optimizing his bid and ask prices
°Bameaand Logue attribute It to Smldt (1971), although
Smith’s paper does not explicitly develop the connection
between the market-makei’s inventory and his spread- For-
mal models of the relationship between inventories and
spreads can be found in Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendel-
son (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981) and Sirri (1989), among
others.
4l5~,for example, Ross (1983), pp. 106-07.
over time in the face of a stochastic order flow,
will shift both bid and ask rates downward (up-
ward) and increase the width of the spread when
a positive (negative) inventory has accumulated.2
We should expect two of these three ration-
ales for the spread to apply to market-makers’
bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange market.
Because there are numerous market-makers,
competition should eliminate their ability to earn
monopoly rents by charging a premium for pre-
dictable immediacy per se. The adverse selec-
tion argument does apply in the foreign ex-
change market, however, since the spread allows
market-makers some protection against arbit-
rage opportunities. Arbitrage opportunities can
be construed as a form of inside information in
a market where price information is not cen-
tralized. In accordance with the dynamic optimi-
zation models, a market-maker’s inventory level
should affect the spread, widening and shifting
it as inventories accumulate.
Brokers’ Spreads
So far, the discussion of the bid-ask spread
has focused on models in which bid and ask
prices are set by individual market-makers. The
dual role of the stock exchange specialist sug-
gests that this is only part of the story. Spreads
are produced in two fundamentally different
ways. It is only when limit orders are sparse
that a NYSE specialist must step in as a market-
maker to provide an “orderly market.”~’When
limit order volume is sufficient, the specialist
acts as a broker, accounting for incoming limit
orders on the lhnit order book, and pairing
market orders against them. Cohen, Maier,
Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979) note that inade-
quate attention has been given to the fact that
not all prices are market-maker spreads. The
market often makes itself without specialist as-
sistance, through the aggregation of limit ord-
ers on the book.
The foreign exchange market differs from the
NYSE in that the market-making and brokerage
roles are separated: market-makers do not act
as brokers, and brokers do not make markets,
~See shaded insert on page 66.
43The NYSE defines this role in rule 104: “the specialist
should maintain a continuous market with price continuity
and close bid and asked prices, and minimize the effect of
temporary disparity between publicsupply and demand.”
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brokered spreads as determined in a fundamen< be modeled as a pali of exti eme oi dci statisti(
tall different wa~<from market-maker spreads. from independent disti ibutions of pm cha e and
The separation of roles also has other implica- sale limit orders. The disti ibution of these statis-
tions for modeling foreign exchange brokerage. tics would have to be conditional on limit 01 der
A brokered spread is the combination of the volume and on the fict that the best ask must
best bid and best ask. received by the broker as always exceed the best bid, since crossing 01 ci-
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ers transact immediately and are removed from
the book.~~ Perhaps because of its complexity,
such a derivation has not been attempted.
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979)
model limit orders as generated by “yawl” distri-
butions These distributions satisfy three heu-
ristics for the incentives of investors placing
limit orders~~ The heuristics are motivated by a
notion of the centralized exchange as a market
for immediacy; placers of limit orders produce
immediacy, and placers of market orders con-
sume it. This relationship between limit and
market orders is formalized in Cohen, Maier,
Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981), where each half
of the brokered spread is assumed to be gener-
ated by a compound Poisson process A mini-
mum brokered spread results: if the limit order’s
bid (ask) price is sufficiently close to the special-
ist’s ask (bid), the benefit to the investor of being
able to specify the price of a limit otder is over-
whelmed by the cost of foregone immediacy.
Because models of the informational content
of brokered spreads are few, the literature
offers little guidance in modeling brokered
quotes in the foreign exchange market. ‘I’he
yawl distribution is the only explicit distribu-
tional form for brokered spreads in the litera-
ture. Unfoi-tunately, its heuristic basis cannot be
transferred directly to the foreign exchange
market, because market-makers there differ
from stock market investors. Indeed, this may
be an instance in which the foreign exchange
market informs microstructure theory rather
than the other way around. The extant ap-
proaches to brokerage treat it as a service
facilitating predictable immediacy. This aspect of
brokerage is redundant in the foreign exchange
market, because of the multitude of market-
makei-s, each providing immediacy. This redun-
dancv suggests instead that foreign exchange
hi-okerage serves some other function.
One motive for trading through a foreign ex-
change broker is to maintain anonymity — the
name of the hank placing a limit order is not
revealed unless a deal is consummated and then
only to the counterpart~’.1°Anonymity is valu-
able, because revealing a need to buy or sell a
cui-rency puts a market-maker at a bargaining
disadvantage. In addition, anonymity can help
pair market-makers who ordinarily would not
contact each other directly. ‘l’hese issues have
not been explored at a theoretical level. Until an
adequate microstructural model of the strategic
benefits of anonymity is developed, the theoreti-
cal understanding of foreign exchange broker-
age will be limited
CONCLUSION’S
Students of the foreign exchange market can
draw several lessons from the literature on
market microstructure. The most fundamental
of these is that the institutional details of ex-
change in a market can affect all aspects —
price, allocational, informational and operational
— of the market’s efficiency. A multitude of
market-makers who can provide liquidity, or
predictable immediacy, arises in response to the
decentralization of the market. As a result,
search costs are reduced relative to a world
without market-makers, because finding one of
many market-makers amounts to finding a
counterpartv. Brokerage also reduces search
costs by achieving a degree of centralization in
price information.
An unanswered question is why the specific
combination of trading structures characteristic
of the foreign exchange market — a decentral-
ized, open-book, direct arrangement and a
quasi-centralized, limit-hook, brokered arrange-
ment — should coexist. Apparently, each struc-
ture has relative advantages, but a full analysis
of these advantages is lacking. Is there a single
microsti-ucture that would combine the relative
advantages of the chrect and brokered arrange-
ments? Put another way, why does the micro-
structure of the foreign exchange market differ
from that of the stock exchanges, the futures
pits and the OTC stock market? Answering these
questions will require a fuller specification of
the objectives of a trading system and a better
understanding of the impact of rnicrostructural
arrangements on those goals.
These issues pro\’ide a motive for deeper in-
vestigation of the behavior of the foreign cx-
45The yawl distribution, named for its resemblance to a sail-
boat, is a probability distribution contrived for modeling the
generation of buy (or sell) limit orders. See Cohen, Maier,
Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979, 1983, 1986) for details.
465ee Kubarych (1983), p. 16, Burnham (1991), p. 141, and


















~4An order statistic is defined as follows: the sample realiza-
tions of a finite number of independent random variables
are ranked in increasing order, and the kth order statistic
is the kth number in that list. For the foreign exchange
market, the modeling is still more complex, since brokers
compare books amongst themselves in the sense that in-
coming orders can cross against any book.
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change m~u’ketand its participants. Market-
makers are the crucial element: they pi-ovide all
tr~msactionprices in the market and are in-
volved in at least one sidle of every deal. The
microstructure literature has developed numer-
ous models of the interpretation and setting of
prices by traders. 1’he diversity of expectations
models used in the literature illustrates the im-
portance of tailoring such models to the specific
environment confronted by market participants.
Given that a foreign exchange market-maker’s
double-auction quote can be hit on either side
(bid or ask) with equal ease, he must try to
maneuver his spread to bracket the market’s
consensus valuation of the foreign currency. In
other words, suppliers and demanders of cur-
rency are indistinguishable to the market-maker
cx ante. The inability to separate the forces die-
termining effective demand from those tIe-
termining effective supply in the very short run
imply that a single-price expectations process
(rather than a dual-price process) is appropriate
in modeling market-makers in the foreign ex-
change market.
A market-maker’s bid-ask spread serves several
purposes. Competition among market-makers in
the foreign exchange market implies that they
should be unable to charge a monopoly premi-
um for the set-vice of predictable immediacy. In-
stead, the spread obviates the need for perfect
price consensus by giving the market-maker
some protection from arbitrageurs with superior
price information. While arbitrage avoidance
must he considered a primary goal in setting a
market-maker’s bid and ask quotes, the spread
provides flexibility elsewhere. Just as arbitrage
ayoidance is concerned with accurately estimat-
ing current prices, speculation is concerned
with estimating future prices. B~’changing in
size and shifting up or down, the spread can
control stochastically the market-maker’s foreign
currency inventory in the face of random order
flows. Systematic empirical studs’ of the effect
of inventories on market-makers’ spreads is still
needed, however.
The brokered spread is less well understood
than the market-maker’s spread, and certain
areas are ripe for further research. Theoretical
models of hrokered spreads are few. The exist-
ing rationales for brokerage maintain that it
provides liquidity services. In the foreign ex-
change market, however, numerous market-
makers make the liquidity services providedl by
brokerage superfluous. Descriptions of the for-
eign exchange market suggest instead that
anonymity is an important motive for trading in
the broket-ed market. Yet the stt-ategic value of
anonymity in foreign exchange quoting is not
well understood at a theoretical level. In addi-
tion. there is not a clear understanding of the
differences in price information between a
mat-ket-maker’s spread and a ht’oker’s spread;
this too remains a topic for future i-esearch.
From a broader perspective, a better under-
standing of institutional choice and change as
regards securities market mnicrostructure is
necessary. Most microstructural research has
been devoted to analyzing the impact of micro-
structural factors on important economic vari-
ables, such as price and allocation. Relativel
little attention has been paid to the effect of
economic factot-s on the choice of an institution-
al microstructure.
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